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ABSTRACT:
As a common European institute of the monetary issue, the European 
Central Bank, will have to emerge as a new entity within the European 
Community. In particular, the bank will be the ultimate target of an European 
Monetary Union and seems to be so acknowledged by a clear majority of 
European Community governments.
Starting from the creation of the Bundesbank, the thesis goes on with the 
situation of the Bundesbank in the European Monetary System and the 
European Monetary Union. Then the German economic, social and monetary 
union is covered.
The European Central Bank's organization is analyzed and compared with 
that of the Bundesbank. The constitutions of both the European Central Bank 
and the Bundesbank spell out the principal objective as monetary policy.
A future central bank for a common European currency will look much like 
the Bundesbank, following its model of Independence from government, and 
it has many similarities in administrative structure.
Ö Z E T :
Avrupa Merkez Bankası, Avrupanın parasal konularda ortak bir müessesesi 
olarak, Avrupa Topluluğu içinde yeni bir varlık oluşturacaktır. Bu banka bilhassa 
Avrupa Para Birliğinin nihai bir hedefidir ve Avrupa Topluluğunu oluşturan bir 
çok üye ülke tarafından da tasdik edilmiştir.
Bu tez Alman merkez bankası Bundesbank'ın kuruluşundan başlayarak, 
bankanın Avrupa Para Sistemi ve Avrupa Para Birliği içindeki konumu ile devam 
eder. Ayrıca Almanya'nın kendi ekonomik, sosyal ve parasal birleşimi ele 
alınmıştır.
Avrupa Merkez Bankasının organizasyonu analiz edilmiş ve Bundesbank'ın 
organizasyonu ile mukayesesi yapılmıştır. Her iki bankanın teşkilatları, 
kendilerine parasal politikaları esas hedef olarak almışlardır.
Avrupa ortak para birliğinin gelecekteki merkez bankası, Bundesbank'ın 
devletten bağımsız ve yönetim yapısına bir çok yönden benzeyen modelde bir 
banka olacaktır.
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I- INTRODUCTION
From a country in ruins at the end of the Second World War, 
West Germany grew into one of the world's most powerful economies. 
A leading world exporter, the Federal Republic sits with Japan and the 
United States among the informal 'Group of Three' industrial nations, 
which have more de facto power over the international economy today 
than the larger and more formal 'Group of Seven' . Before the 
economic, monetary and social union of the two Germanies on July 1 
1990, the Deutschmark had become an international reserve 
currency. The Bundesbank will control vital aspects of the 
development of the united Germany within the European Community 
(EC), soon to be the world's largest internal market, the Bundesbank 
can sometimes exercise decisive power over items on the economic 
and political agenda. Flaving created a stability bloc of low-inflation 
countries in Europe through its influence within the European 
Monetary System (EMS), Bundesbank policies can directly affect the 
domestic economic policies of Germany's EC partners. By any 
standard, then, the Bundesbank belongs to the small elite of national 
institutions that, for the foreseeable future, will influence the course of 
international politics.
Despite Germany's key importance in the world economy, the 
political culture and institutions of the Federal Republic remain largely 
unfamiliar to outsiders. Outside Germany the Bundesbank often 
appears as a monolithic structure unwavering in the fight against
inflation, and excessively influencing the economies of other EC 
countries.
Inflation problem in the 1920s, put the German economy in a bad 
situation. Because of this negative experience, in order to protect the 
stability, German’s organized their economic actions on low inflation 
rate.The Bundesbank is a federal institution and its institutional 
characteristics make it quite different from other central banks in 
Europe. No other central bank in Europe and not even the United 
States Federal Reserve, on which the Bundesbank was modelled, 
enjoys the same degree of autonomy over monetary policy. Chapter II 
focuses on the Bundesbank policies starting from its creation up to the 
1980s.
The reasons for the Bundesbank's unique character must be 
sought for in the German state tradition and the practical lessons of 
recent German history. The Bundesbank is no exception to the overall 
pattern of public institutions in the Federal Republic. In a world where 
public policy is increasingly affecting economic policy, it is hardly 
surprising that constitutional government extends to the monetary as 
well as the political areas. So, as a federal institution, the 
Bundesbank's organization and powers reflect the norms of the rule of 
law, or Rechtsstaat, in today's Germany and its institutional practice 
centers on a basic norm: protecting the currency against inflation.
At home the Bank faces no serious challenge to its authorithy, but 
the growing importance of largely uncontrollable international factors, 
arising directly from Germany's prominence in the international
economy and its leading role in the European Community, affects the 
successful pursuit of its objectives.
In the wider international sphere the Bundesbank norm constitutes 
a significant limitation of Germany's political flexibility, but as 
Germany's importance in the global economy and in Europe 
increases, the Bundesbank's situation is also changing. Its behaviour 
during the 1980s reveals a national instution struggling to manage 
sometimes anarchic international pressures without sacrificing its own 
institutional identity. That is especially so in the context of European 
politics, where the Deutschmark's role as 'anchor currency' in the 
EMS and the size of its economy give Germany the leading role. 
These issues are studied in Chapter III of the thesis, with the situation 
of Bundesbank in the European Monetary Union (EMU).
International cooperation in monetary matters has usually been of 
limited interest to scholars and students of International Relations. It is 
highly probable that monetary matters while entering to the twenty- 
first century are going to gain more importance for EC and for other 
countries in the world. Within the EC, monetary cooperation has 
increasingly become a vehicle for political integration. The Treaty on 
European Union, signed at Maastricht on February 7, 1992, the so 
called Maastricht Treaty, consists of social, political, economic and 
monetary elements. The provisions regarding economic and monetary 
policy are by far the most ambitious, developed and important 
because in this field the EC has a decade of momentum. The 
Maastricht Treaty explicitly relies on the existent exchange rate 
mechanism of the European Monetary System to provide a smooth
transition to economic and monetary union. As common European 
Institute of issue, the European Central Bank (ECB), will have to 
emerge as a new entity within the EC which will continue to be the 
ultimate target of an EMU and it is very well acknowledged by a clear 
majority of EC governments. Chapter IV discusses the European 
Central Bank, its organization, objectives and independent structure.
Finally, Chapter V tries to predict whether or not the Bundesbank 
is going to be a model for the European Central Bank.
II - B U N D E S B A N K
2.1 C reation  o f the Central Bank:
Germany's division into four zones of occupation in 1945 
effectively ended the existence of the Reichsbank. In its place, the 
western allies created a Land Central Bank for each state in their 
respective zones. By 1948, the need to implement currency reform 
and to lay the foundations for reconstruction led the allies to conclude 
that a common central bank was necessary for the planned West 
German State.
Negotiations over the new central bank continued 
for a number of years as the government sought a 
compromise which could satisfy its various 
constituencies. That compromise was finally 
reached and on 26 July, 1957 and the Deutsche 
Bundesbank was created. The Land Central 
Banks retained their name but were merged within 
the Bundesbank becoming its main offices in each 
state.
2.2 The E lem ent o f the Bank:
Its principle elements are the definition of monetary sovereignty in 
Germany and the definition of its fundamental norm is shortly as the 
establishment of the relationship between the Bank and the federal 
government and finally the organizational arrangement of itself in 
relation to other federal agencies.
There are three statutory elements of the economic constitution: 
the Bundesbank Law of 1957, the Credit Law of 1964 and the stability 
and Growth Law of 1967. The Bundesbank Law is the primary legal 
source of Bank's and powers.
2.3 Econom ic policy and the d ivis ion  o f pow ers:
The Bundesbank Law incorporates checks intended to insulate the 
central bank from improper political pressures and this law assigns 
responsibility for general economic policy to the federal government, 
but it places monetary policy within the jurisdiction of the Bundesbank. 
This definition of institutional authorities creates the political field of 
the Bundesbank's activities.
The Bundesbank's monetary sovereignty in the Federal Republic is 
established by its statutory definition as 'protector of the currency' and 
by creation of the Bank as a 'legal person' with a unique relationship 
not subordinate to the Federal Government. Also the Bundesbank 
Law gives the Federal government authority to determine general 
economic policy and binds the Bundesbank to support it while also
making the Bank independent of governmental direction in the use of 
its monetary and credit powers.
Some of the paragraphs of the Bundesbank Law 
imply a silent presumption of governmental co­
responsibility for monetary affairs, but appear to 
leave their relation to each other unbalanced.
While the Bundesbank is independent of the 
government, government is responsible for the 
Bank's monetary policy which is an arrangement 
that follows from the statement of a norm and the 
political importance of economic decisions in a 
modern democratic state. 2
2.4 The C entral B ank Council:
The Central Bank Council is the supreme policy-making body of 
the Bundesbank. Its organization follows the pattern of the federal 
government established by the Basic Law, adhering to the federal 
principle of 'one land one vote', whereby each of the landers, 
regardless of its size or wealth in the Federal Republic as a whole, 
can cast only one vote. The "Laender" Central Bank Presidents, the 
Bundesbank President and Vice-President, and up to eight members 
of the Frankfurt Directorate sit on the Central Bank Council.
The Deutsche Bundesbank Act maintained an important role for 
the states in the selection of the Land Central Bank Presidents. By 
stipulating that the Central Bank Council would consist of the eleven
Land Central Bank presidents and a maximum of ten directors- 
including the President and Vice-President mentioned before, the act 
ensured that the federal government would never be able to nominate 
a majority on the Central Bank Council. Even more important, it 
maintained the central bank's independence vis-a-vis the government.
The Council meets fortnightly to discuss current issues and future 
policy and sets monetary and credit policy for the Bundesbank. The 
Council's policy decisions can virtually veto the economic and fiscal 
plans of elected German Officials. Within its own parameters, the 
Council is democratic and takes decisions according to the 
parliamentary rules.
2.5 The B undesbank and the Federal G overnm ent:
German public law frames the relations of the Bundesbank and 
federal government as a set of rights and duties. Although the Bank's 
monetary policy-making is largely autonomous of government, 
political leaders in Bonn do have certain powers over it. Its Directors 
are appointed by the Federal President on the advice of the 
government, and members of the cabinet are entitled to attend 
sessions of the Central Bank Council. Government officials have no 
vote in the Bundesbank Central Council, but they can make 
proposals, and the government has a suspensive veto over Central 
Bank Council Policy. At the government's request a decision can be 
deferred for up to two weeks. While such a delay is not a genuine veto
on the government's part, its use would send a powerful political 
signal to the political economy in Germany and in the world.
The Bundesbank is legally obliged to advise government on 
matters of monetary policy and supply it with information as required, 
and informal communication between the two goes on continuously at 
virtually every level. A branch of the International Division usually 
prepares position papers for the federal government of the funds 
policy of the International Monetary Fund.
The government's powers over the economy mean that the 
Bundesbank has less real control than it appears to have formally and 
must seek the constant or active participation of the government on a 
variety of matters ranging from nomination of the Bundesbank 
Directorate and the issue of small banknotes to its international 
obligations. The Bundesbank has no similar institutional authority over 
the federal government's economic policy, but on occasion the 
Bundesbank's right to be consulted on proposed legislation can give it 
real political power over the government policy, because the Bank 
must be informed by the government whenever major policy initiatives 
are planned.
Independent of the federal government, the Bundesbank is also 
independent of review and control by the Bundestag, which has never 
questioned the bank's position in Germany's economic constitution. 
Although the Bank's formulation of monetary policy often provokes 
domestic enticism and political controversy, this has not weakened its 
institutional position. Its legal status, however, engenders a degree of 
political power that often constrains an elected government. Although
bound formally to support the government's economic policy, it has 
been able to assert a monopoly over the final interpretation of what 
support any given case means. The bank's real power derives from its 
ability to make monetary policy without consulting Bonn.
2.6 B undesbank's  policies during the 1960s and the 1980s:
The international dimension of Bundesbank policy-making is long- 
lasting and dates back to Bretton Woods, but the form of conflicts over 
imported inflation has changed under the regime of floating rates. 
From the early 1960s to the mid-1970s, the Bundesbank viewed 
inflation generated outside Germany as the main threat to monetary 
stability and Bank officials believed their control over this factor would 
increase once they were released from mandatory intervention. 
Interdependence proved that expectation vain. Since the 1970s, 
economic relations have been internationalized through autonomous 
capital movements and market expectations that are beyond the 
control of states to a greater degree than ever before.
The external value of the mark and sensitivity to foreign demand 
for its goods created Germany's central dilemma, a situation which 
Bundesbank policy-makers saw as compounded by fixed exchange 
rates. The formal obligation to buy and sell dollars and marks under 
the Bretton-Woods system generated additional monetary 
management problems. The lack of external security meant that
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German monetary policy was disturbed over a long period of time by 
interest rate induced and speculative inflows of capital and finally had 
to limit itself to endeavoring to neutralize the expansive influence from 
abroad by contractive processes at home.
The end of Bretton-Woods removed the constraint of obligatory 
intervention to support official exchange rates. With its external flank 
secured, the bank was free to develop its past-1973 paradigm; priority 
for domestic stability and constancy in monetary policy. But this period 
of relative international independence was short-lived.
The introduction of the European Monetary system on 13 March 
1979 placed new intervention responsibilities on the Bundesbank, 
ultimately creating a European Bretton Woods with the German 
currency as anchor.
Internationally committed once again via the Plaza and Louvre 
aggrements, as well as the EMS, the Bundesbank standard continued 
to guide policy through the turbulence of the late 1970s and the 
1980s, a period when the Germans came under increased pressure to 
take a greater economic lead.
From 1977 onwards, the Germans came under American and 
British pressure to stimulate their domestic economy and act as the 
'locomotive' of Western economic recovery. They resisted from the 
start with arguments from the Bundesbank arsenal: domestic growth, 
projected at 4.5-5.5 %, was high enough and further stimulus would 
undermine the country's monetary stability. But despite this 
resistance, the Germans were beginning to shift their position.
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As Germany emerges as the pre-eminent European economic 
power, international attention on the Bundesbank is generating new 
pressure on it. Defined essentially in terms of its domestic legislation, 
the Bank is a national institution increasingly subject to international 
demands.
Instutional changes in the past two decades are one aspect of 
these transformations; as the number of participants in international 
monetary policy-making decreases, the political power of those still 
involved increases. During a period of intensifying interdependence, 
the number of those who really matter in the international system has 
remained very small. The more exclusive circles of G-7 and G-3 
leaders have supplanted the International Monetary Fund, which has 
more than 100 member countries, within the framework, the 
Deutschmark is now the world's second reserve and intervention 
currency. This has inevitably enhanced the power of the Bundesbank. 
Bundesbank policy-makers throughout 1986-7 felt 
themselves backed into a corner and simply 
isolated. As inflation and the money supply figures 
began to get out of control towards the end of 
1988 a sense of Schaden Freude among 
Bundesbank policy-makers made itself felt. For 
one faction, now possibly the most powerfull in the 
Bundesbank, the experience of 1985-8 confirmed 
the central element of the Bundesbank paradigm: 
protect the currency at all coasts.3
12
The Bundesbank tends to balance domestic responsibilities 
against the international pressures, consistently emphasizing the 
priority of the former. Its domestic and international policy choices in 
the years 1961, 1979-82 and 1985-7 are likely to remain the 
formative cases for its attitude in the future. International issues have 
greatly complicated the Bank's field of political action, and its rhetoric 
has to be seen in the context of its pragmatic responses to Germany's 
political interests and to pressure from its trade partners.
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Ill - BUNDESBANK'S SITUATION IN THE EMS AND THE EMU 
3.1 The E uropean M onetary System  (EM S) and the Bundesbank:
The European Monetary System (EMS) was viewed by its creators 
as an intermediate step towards monetary unification. The Conclusion 
of the Presidency of the European Council of 4 December 1978 
stated that: The purpose of the European Monetary System is to 
establish a greater measure of monetary stability in the Community 
and should be seen as a fundamental component of a more 
comprehensive strategy aimed at lasting growth and stability, a 
progressive retain to full employment, the harmonization of living 
standards and the Community. The Monetary System would also 
facilitate the convergence of economic development and give fresh 
impetus to the process of European Union.
The EMS started functioning in March 1979 as an arrangement 
among the central banks of the EC member countries to manage 
inter-community exchange rates and to finance exchange market 
interventions. Its basic features are an exchange rate mechanism 
(ERM) with the rules of intervention, the European Currency Unit 
(ECU) and several credit facilities. In practice, both the ECU and 
credit facilities have lost their function, and the operating part of the 
EMS is the ERM. Characteristic features of the ERM are fluctuation 
bands around bilateral central parities, a possibility of realignments of 
the parities, and, although initially designed symmetric, the use of the 
DM as the 'anchor' of the system.
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The EMS includes all members of the EC, whereas in the 
beginning only a group of countries participated in the ERM, namely 
Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg, Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Ireland. Spain and Portugal joined in 1989 and the 
United Kingdom in 1990.
The ECU is a composite unit of account, made up of a basket of a 
fixed number of each Community currency. The composition of the 
basket depends solely on EC membership. Each currency has a 
certain weight in the basket, initially set according to the economic 
size of each country. The weight of the DM in the basket has been 
around % 30.
Each Community currency has an ECU central rate. A divergence 
indicator shows when a currency departs too much from the central 
rate. Consequently, bilateral central grids have become the 
determining feature of the ERM. The grid is formed by calculating the 
ratio of any two central rates and assigning margins from this bilateral 
central parity. The bilateral margins are set at 2.25 % on each side of 
the central parity, allowing a fluctuation band of 4.5%. Wherever a 
currency goes beyond its fluctuation band there is an obligation to 
intervene by joined action of the two respective central banks. This 
can be done either by the "stronger" central bank buying the "weaker" 
currency or by the selling of the "stronger" currency by the "weaker" 
central bank through credit from the "stronger" central bank.
An important attribute of the ERM is the possibility of realignments 
to correct imbalances, i.e over-or under valuation grown by time for 
external reason, in the system. In the beginning, realignments were
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mostly unilateral, either involving only one currency or initiated by only 
on a country asking for complete new set of parities.
Although often cited as one of the main goals of setting up the 
ERM, there is no explicit rule governing inflation control. Inflation rate 
convergence toward low inflation member countries was not agreed 
on or even implied initially.
However, different rates of inflation affect the 
stability of foreign exchange rates as it directly 
makes some currencies appreciate and others 
depreciate and hence povoke competitive 
devaluations. After 1983 an implicit agreement on 
convergence toward the low German inflation rate 
was adapted.^
"This was connected with the French government's decision to apply 
tighter monetary policy." 2 Consequently Germany was in a position to 
determine the anchor inflation rate of the system. It sets its monetary 
growth target according to its own desired inflation rate, while the 
other members have to adjust their monetary policy to Germany's. 
Thus the Bundesbank's low inflation targets have gained Germany a 
position of "monetary anchor" for the whole system.
Consequently since 1983 the other member 
countries of the ERM started to peg their currency 
to the DM, and the bilateral central grids were 
calculated between any given currency and the 
DM. The DM emerged as the numeraire for the
16
ERM, and Germany as the "anchor" or "center" of 
the system. 3
The confusion between the existence of ECU central parities and 
bilateral parity grids based on the DM is a result of a debate over the 
advantages of a symmetric system as opposed to European 
experiences during the asymmetric Bretton Woods system, and the 
distrust of weak "imaginary" currency unit on the behalf of Germany 
who had a "strong" currency. The Bundesbank resisted joining a 
system with only ECU central parities. Although the DM has 
consistently had a weight around % 30 in the ECU basket, the 
Bundesbank was able to foresee that within the system the DM was 
bound to appreciate against other currencies, and interventions to 
support other currencies or to keep the DM down would mean loosing 
its monetary stability for Germans. The DM is a question of national 
pride and domestic stability. This is understandable in terms of 
Germany's historical experiences with hyperinflation and later on a 
feeling of being left alone when the snake was in trouble in late 
1970s. There was also a strong opposition from the Bundesbank's 
point of view to enter an exchange rate system before there was more 
cooperation in economic policies.
The Bundesbank initially opposed the EMS. The European 
Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) was a particular obstacle. The 
Bank feared that obligatory intervention and a joint financing 
mechanism would bring back the familiar problems of Bretton Woods. 
The Bundesbank feared that these would turn the EMS into an
17
artificial exchange-rate system divorced from economic fundamentals, 
thus generating inflationary pressures in Germany.
From the Bundesbank's perspective, the EMS is a balancing act in 
which the Bundesbank standard is juggled with international and 
European responsibilities. Exchange-rate policy is sensitive because 
of the postulated link between money supply targets and inflation; 
systems such as the EMS constrain the Bank's pursuit of the 
domestic stability goal. Though central banks are obliged to intervene 
when currencies hit the top or bottom of their bans, their intervention 
before that stage remains discretionary. Conflicts of judgements and 
interest over when to intervene shape the politics of EMS 
management and carry implications for the Bundesbank's strategy of 
controlling inflation.
As a side effect of securing exchange-rate targets, intervention 
changes the domestic money supply. Thus a devaluing country buys 
up its currency in exchange for foreign reserves. This reduces liquidity 
in that country, forcing up domestic interest rates, tightening monetary 
policy and reducing inflation. The effects for the economy of the 
appreciating country are the reverse. Appreciation creates more 
purchasing power, which is used to accumulate foreign exchange, 
thus increasing money supply in the medium term and hence inflation. 
Theoretically, then, the exchange values of two or more currencies 
represent the ratio of their money stocks. If the price of currencies is 
fixed; as it is under international mechanisms such as the ERM, then 
the stocks will have to be adjusted to maintain the ratio. "That holds 
true for each of three types of EMS intervention: 1) Marginal
18
intervention, 2) Intramarginal interventions, and 3) Intramarginal 
intervention in US dollars." ^
While the technique of EMS interventions involves relatively simple 
operations, their practice is another story in political terms. Central 
banks may try to off set changes in domestic liquidity brought about 
by foreign exchange market interventions through open market 
activities. The increases or decreases in liquidity are thus sterilized, 
and consequently the exchange rate has to change in the medium 
term.
"Throughout 1970s Germany suffered from DM/USD fluctuations 
which were harmful for its competitiveness. Germany wanted to "limit 
the detrimental effects of dollar disturbances." 5 Now as a regional 
block around Germany the ERM gives more stability for DM real 
exchange rates, and consequently better terms of trade for Germany. 
It did not need to trade off this enchanced competitiveness with 
monetary independence, because the ERM uses Germany as the 
anchor country. Hence, Germany has kept its independence and 
stability while gaining improved competitiveness, a strong current 
account and more stable real exchange rate.
The leading role of Germany in the ERM does not stem from its 
economic size compared to other member countries, but is derived 
directly from Bundesbank’s reputation of adhering to price stability 
and its low inflation targeting. It has been commented that the ERM is 
" an arrangement for France and Italy to purchase a commitment to 
low inflation by accepting German Monetary policy." ^ And when the 
United Kingdom was considering joining the ERM, the main
19
advantages mentioned in the debate were associated with the 
reputation of the Bundesbank.
The German dominance in the ERM is a widely 
acknowledged fact. At least since the implicit 
agreement on anti-inflation targeting in 1983 
Germany and the Bundesbank have been a 
hegemonic center-setting its own monetary policy 
so as to achieve internal price stability while the 
other members hold on to the DM " borrowing " its 
reputation. ^
This also implies that Germany is isolated from the rest of the 
countries, i.e. not affected their policy choices. There is a 
considerable number of studies pointing to this direction. First, DM 
interest rates usually remain relatively stable in periods of speculative 
pressure which indicates that Germany's Monetary policy is largely 
unaffected by events in European exchange market. Second, other 
ERM countries follow German monetary policy especially in the 
timing of interest rate changes. "They wait for the Bundesbank to 
decide on interest rate adjustments, and follow that in a matter of 
hours." 8 Third, most of the intra-ERM currency interventions are 
carried out by other central banks than the Bundesbank. Moreover, 
other central banks intervene in ERM currencies and increasingly in 
the DM. This shows that countries other than Germany take most of 
the adjustment pressure and the cost of intra-ERM stability is 
asymmetrically shared. Germany usually intervenes only when the 
US dollar starts moving and does it in dollars. It may act either from
20
an " altruistic" motive of trying to prevent the strains within the ERM 
associated with fluctuations of the dollar, or from a desire to avoid 
fluctuations in relative prices and competitiveness against the United 
States.
Whatever the reason, Germany effectively takes 
care of the " external " stability of the ERM and 
leaves most of the interventions within the system 
to other member countries. This implies that the 
Bundesbank's preoccupation is the exchange 
rates of ERM currencies vis-a-vis the dollar, 
whereas other central banks focus on stabilizing 
the position of their currencies vis-a-vis the DM. 9 
The German tendency to intervene in dollar fluctuations can have 
detrimental effects on the rest of Europe, especially if it is in 
recession. Normally, declining dollar would mean a boost to European 
economy, but when Germany 'sterilizes' the capital inflow motivated 
by fear that the cheap dollar inflates its money supply and thus 
produces inflation, this stimulus disappears and recovery in Europe is 
hindered.
Contrary to the Bundesbank's initial fears, the EMS has proved 
manageable within its anti-inflationary framework, and the Bank is 
generally satisfied with its working. EMS membership ties Germany's 
partners to the DM-and thus to the Bundesbank's monetary course. 
Dependence on the German currency has produced unwanted 
political effects for some EMS members particularly France and there 
have been recurrent demands that European 'asymmetry' be reduced.
21
The disagreement turns on German power in the EMS. At one 
level, debate focuses on how a common goal of economic 
convergence should be measured and attained. Complaints about 
present 'asymmetry' refer to national differential of size, efficiency and 
productivity as well as differences in their balance of payment 
position. Demands for increased symmetry most often come from 
representatives of the weaker economies in the EMS, and the most 
important conflict stems from Franco-German imbalances. France's 
persistently negative trade relationship with Germany spilled over into 
the EMS by generating exchange-rate pressures which must be 
stabilized through market interventions and domestic deflation.
At another level, the asymmetry issue is one of fairness. Full 
economic integration assumes that greater convergence can be 
achieved between countries with strong currencies and those whose 
currencies are weak. The question is whether interest and exchange 
rates should reflect divergent price and cost differentials or be used to 
further domestic fiscal and economic policy and the long-range goal of 
European integration. Majority opinion in the Bundesbank, assuming 
that exchange rates must represent a country’s underlying economic 
position, has argued against efforts to use monetary policy to further 
Europe's political goals.
The EMS has made relatively little impact on the German money 
supply over the past ten years. Nevertheless, severe short-term 
fluctuations in bank liquidity and money supply aggregates are caused 
by EMS interventions.
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Overall, in a single decade, the EMS fulfilled its purpose of creating 
'a zone of monetary stability in Europe ' ; But in other respects - 
equitable distribution of financial burdens and substantial 
convergence of the European economies - the system fell short of 
expectations.
3.2 The B un desban k and the E uropean M onetary Union (E M U ) :
When the debate on financing mechanisms for the EMS was 
carried over into other areas, the most far reaching development was 
started. This is the beginning of a plan to replace the EMS with a 
European Monetary Union ( EMU ).
This was contained in the Report on Economic and Monetary 
Union in the European Community; the so called Delors Commitee 
Report. This report was delivered to the European heads of 
government in Madrid in June 1989. The report addressed four central 
questions.
1) Is a single European currency feasible?
2) Could the ECU serve that function?
3) What if a European central bank were to replace the national 
central banks, with responsibility for a single European currency?
4) If such steps were agreed upon, how might the transition be 
organized?
The president of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, 
submitted the so called Delors report in April 1989. This report 
followed an agenda set by the questions listed above and proposed
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that monetary union could be reached through three stages of 
development.
The first step was to include all community members in the ERM 
and to establish the free movement of capital along with goods and 
labour. At this first stage, parity realignments remain possible; the 
member central banks merely commit to keeping exchange rates 
within bands o f±2.25 percent (± 6  percent for Spain and the United 
Kingdom) around the central parities. Already in June 1989 the 
European Council accepted the date set by the Delors Commission, 
July 1, 1990, for the beginning of the first stage.
In Stage Two, the transition would begin from the coordination of 
independent national monetary policies to the formulation and 
implementation of a common monetary policy. Exchange rate 
realignment within the ERM framework would not be ruled out, but 
there would be a growing preference for other adjustment 
mechanisms. As part of this process, there would be increasing co­
ordination of official foreign exchange operations involving non­
member currencies, leading eventually to a common Community 
approach. Simply, Stage Two in the Delors Report would add the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) to the EMS. The 
completion of both economic and monetary union would not be final 
until Stage Three.
In Stage Three, exchange rates would be locked irrevocably and 
ultimately a single European currency could replace national 
currencies. This would require that the transition to a single monetary 
policy be completed. This last step, at once eliminates the possibility
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of imposing capital controls, terminates the EMS, irrevocably fixes 
exchange rates, and transfers full authority for monetary policy to the 
European Central Bank (ECB).
Although proposing three stages for EMU, the Delors Report does 
not establish a time table for their realization, insisting only that Stage 
One should begin on July 1, 1990.
The treaty of Maastricht, negotiated in December 
1991 and formally signed on February 7, 1992 
sets the path for EMU. Maastricht Accord lays 
down the Community's strategy to achieve EMU 
by the year 2000; it sets up the institutional 
framework for European monetary union; and, 
while accepting a gradual approach to EMU, it 
alters the strategy suggested by the Delors 
Committee in several important ways. 10 
First it drops the principle of parallelism entirely. The Accord 
foresees the completion of economic union, with total and 
unconditional freedom of capital movements within the EC, beginning 
by January 1, 1994.
Second, the Accord outlines the institutional developments leading 
to EMU. At the begining of Stage Two, a new European Monetary 
Institute (EMI) will be created, which will administer the EMS and 
prepare the ground for the ECB by coordinating national monetary 
policies and creating the instruments and procedures for the ECB in 
Stage Three. The EMI in turn will be liquidated when the ECB begins 
operations in Stage Three.
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Third, the Accord sets up conditionalities and a precise timetable 
leading to EMU. These conditionalities address the entry to Stage 
Three and aim at the convergence of inflation rates, the performance 
of public finances, and the development of the monetary institutions in 
the EC.
To be eligible for EMU, a country's inflation rate 
must not exceed the lowest three EC inflation 
rates by more than 1.5 percentage points; its 
interest rate on long-term government bonds must 
not exceed by more than 2 percentage points 
those of three member states with the best 
inflation performance: its total government deficit 
must not exceed 60 percent of GDP.  ^1 
For at least two years, the country's exchange rates vis-a-vis other 
EMS currencies must have remained within its EMS band without a 
devolution of its central parities. Finally, the statutes of its national 
central bank must be compatible with the ECB Statute as established 
by the Accord.
To prepare for Stage Three, the EC heads of state or government 
will assess, by December 31, 1996 whether a majority of the EC 
members meet the entry conditions and whether the community is 
ready for Stage Three. If so, a date is to be set for its beginning. 
Countries that do not meet the conditions; technically, 'countries with 
a derogation', are placed on a waiting list to be reconsidered for 
membership in subsequent years. Those that do meet the conditions 
will form the core of EMU. If by the end of 1997, however, no date
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has been set for the start of Stage Three - that is, if a majority of 
countries cannot fulfill the entry conditions or the heads of state or 
government decide it is not appropriate to start EMU - Stage Three 
will begin anyway on January 1, 1999 and will include all those 
countries meeting the entry conditions.
Finally, the Maastricht Accord recognizes that individual members 
of the EC may for political reasons, not wish to join EMU. In the 
separate Protocol on the Transition to the Third Stage of Economic 
and Monetary Union, the European heads of state determined to 
address this potential problem by promising that no member will keep 
the Community from entering EMU.
The Maastricht Accord drops altogether the concept of a learning 
period and provides a much cleaner solution to Community institution 
building in the transition period. It leaves monetary policy entirely in 
the hands of the national authorities until the start of Stage Three. 
During Stage Two, the EMI is set up as a transitional institution 
preparing the way for the ECB. " The ECB, which will be created at 
the start of Stage Three, will not be burdened with public memories of 
the political or economic quagmires that may be encountered during 
the transition phase."
The EMI has three main functions. To begin with, it will inherit the 
EMS and administer its operation. During Stage Two, it is charged 
with strengthening cooperation between the central banks of the 
Member States and the coordination of the monetary policies. In 
exercising this function, the EMI is explicitly committed to price 
stability. Its role is to organize the exchange of information among the
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national central banks and to monitor monetary developments in the 
member states. Recalling that, from the start of Stage Two, the EMS 
can no longer rely on capital controls as safety valves, this 
coordinating function will be much more important than policy 
coordination in the current EMS. The EMI Council has the right to 
formulate and publish opinions about such developments and to 
rebuke governments for too profligate monetary policies. The fact that 
such opinions and their formulation require a qualified majority to pass 
the EMI Council assures, however, that the six most-price-stable 
countries of the EMS will not be able to use the EMI as an outlet for 
public admonitions to EMS members with less stringent monetary 
discipline.
Looking to the future, the EMI will oversee the development of the 
ECU and prepare 'the instruments and procedures necessary for 
carrying out a single monetary policy in the third stage and the rules 
for operations to be undertaken by the national central banks in the 
framework of the ESCB. One of the articles of the EMI Statute directs 
the EMI to specify a 'regulatory, organizational and logical framework 
for the ESCB to perform its tasks in the third stage.' These 
specifications will be submitted for decision for the ECB at the 
beginning of Stage Three. In setting the operating procedures for the 
ECB, the EMI will take a major responsibility for the initial performance 
of the new central bank. The unanimity requirement in the EMI 
Council for the main decisions in this field gives even those countries 
that will not join Stage Three by 1999 significant influence on the 
design of the future ECB. This, again, underlines the federal character
28
of the EMI. The timetable established by the Maastricht Accord 
implies that, at the beginning of Stage Three, some EC members may 
have a derogation and may therefore not join the ESCB. Because the 
EMI disappears at the start of Stage Three, an institutional 
arrangement will be necessary to facililate the continuation of an 
exchange - rate agreement between members of EMU and those 
countries with a derogation. It was the last two stages of the Delors 
Report that created most discussion and the Bundesbank was one of 
the main discussants. The discussion focused on the three points; the 
independence of the envisioned European Central Bank and the 
timing of its establishment, the stability of the common currency, and 
whether economic convergence should happen before or after going 
fonvard in the plan.
The Bundesbank strongly argued that convergence in economic 
policies and performance should be achieved before monetary union. 
It maintained the view that "sufficient and durable convergence 
among the member states had to precede EMU. This led to 
discussion on ‘two-speed Europe ' which means that EMU should 
start functioning only with a core of countries that have good enough 
economic performance.
The Bundesbank was aware that Germany had also domestic 
problems: German Monetary Union had not been a smooth transition, 
and the cast structural transformation in Eastern Laender was a heavy 
burden. It was reluctant to make a commitment to support economies 
in Europe it considered weak or lacking resolution to economic 
convergence while having to deal with domestic responsibilities.
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As the Bundesbank entered the 1990s, it faced the familiar 
dilemma of having its domestic priorities under increasing 
international pressures. The unification process itself made the pursuit 
of domestic anti-inflation objectives more difficult.
For more than three decades, the institutional character of 
Germany's central bank has been defined by its legal norm: 
‘protecting the currency ' which has meant preventing inflation. That 
criterion of monetary policy was assured by the lessons the West 
German public drew from their history in this century. Part of the story 
of the Bundesbank's security at home and monetary success has 
been its ability to persuade Germans that domestic growth cannot be 
pursued at the expense of stable money.
While the Bundesbank retains its domestic focus, the Federal 
Republic of Germany has become a regional and global power. The 
foremost economic nation in Europe, Germany successfully allies its 
foreign policy interests in the European Community to those of its 
main trading partners.
The 'Treaty on European Union ' which was approved by the EC 
Heads of State and of Government on December 10, 1991, and 
signed by the governments of the member states on February 7, 
1992, is intended to create the basis needed for rapid headway in the 
process of European Integration.
3.3 The German Economic, Social and Monetary Union (GEMU)
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The completion of the single European market, 
with the free movement of goods, labour and 
services and capital, is to be followed by the end 
of this decade by the further development of the 
Community into an economic and monetary union 
and what is more - as also propogated by the 
German side, in particular - a political union.
The public debate which commenced in Germany in response to 
the decisions of Maastricht confirms impressively that a threat to 
monetary stability, which is firmly associated with the Deutsche Mark 
in the minds of the population and which is obviously regarded as a 
‘public commodity ', would not simply be accepted, irrespective of its 
source. " In contrast to what occured in other Community member 
states, the general public in Germany started relatively late seriously 
to discuss the pros and cons of a European economic and monetary 
union." In the course of negotiations the Bundesbank had 
repeatedly submitted statements to the Federal Government. It 
attempted in manifold ways to contribute to the necessary process of 
clarification at an early stage, focusing attention on the need for a 
stable currency and for an effective monetary policy geared to 
achieving this end.
Those processes of international change now ensnare the 
Bundesbank and carry profound implications for its position in a new 
Germany and a new Europe. Some of these processes have been 
explored as the liberalization of capital markets and volatile exchange- 
rate structures which forge sometimes unwanted linkages between
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the Bank's domestic monetary factors and the economies of other 
nations. There are two cases which hold the possibility of 
revolutionary changes in store: the prospect of European Monetary 
Union, and the reality of German Economic, Social and Monetary 
Union.
The Treaty between the Federal Republic and the German 
Democratic Republic that came into affect on 1 July 1990 and 
marked the beginning of German unification has already enhanced 
the Bundesbank's domestic perspective. Though anxious not to 
suggest an obvious conflict between the goals of European 
integration and German unification, the Bundesbank, like all 
institutions of German government, focuses on a difficult task of 
setting national priorities and balancing those against European and 
international commitments. German monetary and economic union is 
different from European integration in one important respect; the 
eastern Laender have now been absorbed legally by the Federal 
Republic and, unlike Europe's nation-states, the sovereignty of the 
German Democratic Republic was already partly extinguished when 
the GEMU came into effect. But the political and financial demands 
German unification will make on Germany's wealth and political 
culture are for greater than those it has yet faced from the pressures 
of European Unity.
As monetary and economic union between the two Germanys 
takes effect, there are signs that workers in the eastern Laender are 
not so disciplined and that, for them, wage demands may come 
before monetary stability. In addition to the potential discrepancy
between East and West German 'stability consciousness', financing 
the economic restructuring in the east will certainly strain German 
monetary management.
When the Bundesbank was put in charge of 
monetary policy for the whole of the east, it 
stressed its standard of sound money in the 
weeks preceding the introduction of the 
Deutschmark in the German Democratic Republic.
Now that monetary union is completed, it has 
reverted to a modified version, stressing the need 
to keep wages in the line with productivity in East 
German enterprises, but accepting that only a 
radical break with the socialist economic system 
could liberate the forces of capital creation and 
productivity on which a rebuilt social system in the 
eastern Lander depends.
Now that Germany is reunited, there are no signs of significant 
change in the Bundesbank paradigm for monetary management. On 
the contrary: reviewing its work in 1989 and looking forward to the 
demands of unification; the Bundesbank offered a familiar analysis of 
the situation Germany would soon face: An exposed flank - 
inflationary pressures from outside - and domestic demand that 
exceeded capacity - inflationary pressures from within. In order to 
manage those demands within the Bundesbank paradigm, interest 
rates and the external value of the Mark would have to stay high. 
Wages and prices in the east had to be realistic and most importantly
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from the Bank's perspective restructuring should not be financed 
through new credit. German unity, so the Bundesbank's prescription 
reads, cannot be borrowed against future productivity, but must be 
paid for now through savings and taxes.
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IV -  T H E  E U R O P E A N  C E N T R A L  B A N K
As a common European institute of issue, the European Central 
bank, will have to emerge as a new entity within the EC in order to 
render community wide central enactments with regard to monetary 
policy in its entirety, its jurisdiction will comprise matters of principle as 
well as particulars. In particular, the European central bank will 
continue to be the ultimate target of an EMU and seems to be so 
acknowledged by a clear majority of EC governments. National 
central banks will retain their legal personality under domestic law. 
However, to secure the compatibility of national 
central bank legislation with the European system 
of Central Bank statute and the EEC Treaty, 
pertinent domestic constitutional and statutory 
provisions, including the statutes of the national 
central banks, will have to be adapted 
accordingly.”'
The ECB and the national central banks but not the ESCB itself can 
own, buy and sell assets, contract and sue or be sued. The term 
'system' thus has to be understood as referring to the existence of 
the ECB and the national institutes of issue as parts of the ESCB 
which, as an ensemble, are governed by a common set of rules and 
committed to the objectives and tasks assigned to it. It has become 
known that most of the EC national central banks consider that a 
participating central bank would be one whose national sovereign
35
appertains to the EMU or has fully accepted its objectives and has 
pledged to become a member as soon as possible.
The performance of EMU will depend critically on the institutional 
design of the ECB, one important aspect of which is its independence 
from the European governments. Central bank independence from 
government is not only necessary to achieve lasting price stability; 
empirical evidence suggests also that long-run inflation rates are 
lower in countries with independent central banks.
The Delors Commitee described the future European central bank 
simply as ' independent' without further explanation. The Maastricht 
Accord, however, is very specific on the subject.
4.1 Table 1. The Proposed European Central Bank Compared To
The Bundesbank
********************************************************************************
European Central B ank (ECB)
OBJECTIVES The primary objective of the System shall be to 
maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the 
objective of price stability, the System shall 
support the general economic policy of the 
Community. The System shall act consistently 
with free competitive markets.
INDEPENDENCE Neither the ECB, nor a national central bank, nor any
member of their decision-making bodies shall seek or 
take instructions from Community institutions or 
bodies,from any government of a Member State or 
from any other body. The Community institutions and
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bodies and the governments of the Member States 
undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to 
influence the members of the decision making bodies 
of the ECB and of the national central banks in the 
performance of their tasks.
BOARD President, vice-president, and four other members
COUNCIL Members of the Board plus governors of the twelve 
national central banks
APPOINTMENT
LENGTH
Eight years, not renewable
APPOINTMENT
PROCEDURE
European Council; Governing Council and European 
Parliament are consulted.
VOTING Each member has one vote. The president has a tie­
breaking vote. Weighted voting applies to issues 
dealing with capital, transfer of foreign resource 
assets, and distribution of income.
INSTRUMENTS the ECB shall be entitled to
*operate in the financial markets by buying and 
selling outright (spot and fonward) or under 
repurchase agreement claims and marketable 
instruments, whether in Community or in 
foreign currencies, as well as precious metals.
* conduct credit operations with credit institutions 
and other market participants.
* establish general principles for open-market 
and credit operations carried out by itself or the 
national central banks, including the 
announcement of conditions under which the 
ECB stands ready to enter into such
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transactions.
* require credit institutions to hold minimum 
reserves on accounts with the ECB and 
national central banks, with the regulations 
concerning the calculation and determination 
of the required minimum reserves to be 
established by the Governing Council.
* levy penalty interest in cases of noncompliance 
impose other sanctions with comparable 
impact.
‘ conduct foreign-exchange operations consistent 
with the provisions of Article 109 of the Treaty. 
The Council can decide on unspecified 
operational methods of monetary control.
* the ECB and national central banks shall not 
grants overdrafts or any other type of credit 
facility to Community institutions, governments 
or other public entities of Member States or 
purchase debt instruments directly from them.
Bundesbank
OBJECTIVES The Bundesbank regulates the circulation of 
money and the provision of credit to the 
economy, using the authority given it by the 
Bundesbank Act, with the objective of safe 
guarding the currency and providing for the 
settlement of the banking aspects of payments 
domestically and wirh foreign countries. The 
Bundesbank is required to support the general 
economic policy of the federal government 
subject to fulfilling its own task.
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INDEPENDENCE Independent of the federal government in 
exercising the authority given to it by the 
Bundesbank Act..
BOARD President, vice-president, and up to eight other 
members.
COUNCIL Members of the Board plus presidents of the 
eleven land central banks
APPOINTMENT
LENGTH
Eight years, renewable
APPOINTMENT
PROCEDURE
President of the Republic; proposal by federal 
government (Board) or Bundesrat (Land); 
Council is consulted
VOTING Each member has one vote. The president has a 
tie-breaking vote. Weighted voting applies to 
issues dealing with capital, transfer of foreign 
resource assets, and distribution of income.
INSTRUMENTS The Bundesbank
* fixes the interest rates and discount rates 
applicable to its transactions and determines 
the guide lines for its loan and open-market 
operations.
* purchases or sells trade bills or checks for 
which three guarantors, known to be solvent, 
are liable; bills must have a maturity of less 
than three months and must be good trade 
bills.
* purchases or sells treasury bills issued by the 
federal government or a federal state with a
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maturity of less than three months.
* grants interest-bearing loans against collateral 
for a minimum of three months and with the 
collateral meeting specific requirements.
* purchases and sells means of payment 
denominated in foreign currency, including 
trade bills and cheks, claims and securities, 
gold, silver, and platinum.
* grants short-term credit to the federal 
government, the special funds, and the 
federal states in the form of book credits or 
treasury bills.
* purchases or sells trade bills fulfilling specified 
requirements, treasury bills, and treasury notes 
issued by the federal government, special 
funds, and federal states; bonds and 
debentures issued by specific debtors; and 
other bonds admitted to tade at the official 
exchange.
SOURCE: European Council (Maastricht Accord), 1991 (Protocol on the 
Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the 
European of Central Bank).
4.2  C entral B ank O rgan ization:
There are strong similarities in the structure of the decision making 
bodies and processes of the ECB and the Bundesbank. Both have 
councils formulating the general guidelines of monetary policy to be 
discharged by their executive boards. Both councils are composed of 
the members of their respective boards - six for the ECB and up to ten
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for the Bundesbank - and either the central - bank governors of 
countries without a derogation or the presidents of the eleven land 
central banks. Members of both Councils have one vote each, and 
only in specific cases may the ECB call for weighted voting. In the 
event of a tie, the presidents of both councils may cast two votes. 
Actions before both councils require a simple majority vote, unless 
specified otherwise.
One important aspect of the composition of the central - bank 
council in the Community system is the weight given the 
representation of central, or Community, interests relative to that 
given the member states in monetary - policy decisions. With a 
common currency, the objectives of monetary policy will necessarily 
be defined in terms of Community aggregates, that is, a European 
price level and European output and employment. The governors of 
the national central banks, however, will have little interest in 
Community variables and will be primarily concerned with price 
stability and output and employment in their own regions.
Realizing that a common monetary policy is not 
suited to meet regional output and employment 
targets, the Governing Council will naturally be 
inclined to give higher priority to the low - inflation 
target of the common monetary policy than will be 
the ECB Executive Board, which, because it 
represents a Community institution, will define its 
responsibilities in terms of Community aggregates.
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The Executive Board members will therefore push more strongly in 
the Governing Council for active, discretionary output and 
employment stabilization at the Community level that will the 
governors of the national member banks.
Although the weight of the ECB Board on the Governing Council 
will be one - third when EMU is complete with twelve EC members, 
Community interests may be expected to be represented 
disproportionately before that. Under normal circumstances, the 
number of ECB Board members will be six; initially, it may be four but 
no fewer. Should seven countries qualify for Stage Three in 1997 - a 
very optimistic scenario - the weight of the Board on the Governing 
Council will be no less than 36 percent but perhaps as much as 46 
percent. If Stage Three starts in 1999, instead, with fewer than seven 
members, the Board members might have 50 percent of the votes - 6 
out of 12 - or might even form a majority on the Governing Council. In 
comparison, there have been either six or seven Executive Board 
members on the Bundesbank council since the 1970s, accounting for 
either 35 or 39 percent of the Council's total votes. Thus, in time, the 
ECB is likely to be a less federalist institution than the Bundesbank.
One of the articles of ECB statute foresees the establishment of 
general principles for open market and credit operations. It allows the 
ECB to purchase and sell claims and marketable instruments in 
transactions with virtually anyone - governments, corporations, or 
individuals. Also another article of the ECB statute allows the ECB to 
introduce new methods of monetary control at its own discretion, 
provided only that they be consistent with an open market economy
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with free competition. In contrast to the ECB, the Bundesbank Act is 
more restrictive. It limits credit operations to those with credit 
institutions and permits open-market operations only in certain types 
of assets. The Bundesbank Act is also more specific than the ECB 
statute on maximum - reserve requirements. This greater specificity 
effectively protects the Bundesbank from pressures of groups 
attempting to use or incent new instruments - such as cheap financing 
opportunities for government - owned financial institutions to serve 
their own financial interests.
4.3  The O b jective  o f the C entral Bank:
The constitutions of both the ECB and the Bundesbank spell out 
the principal objective of monetary policy and subject this objective to 
a condition. The ECB Statute is much more specific in this regard than 
is the Bundesbank Act. Article 2 of the ECB Statute, which repeats 
Article 103 of the Maastricht Accord, declares price stability to be the 
primary objective of the ECB. The Bundesbank Act has no such 
specific provision.
Its Article 3 gives the Bundesbank a mandate to 
safeguard the stability of the currency, a much 
broader nation than price stability. In fact , the 
authors of the Bundesbank Act made it very clear 
they did not want to commit the bank specifically 
to price stability. Although the bank itself interprets 
its mandate in terms of price stability, it is clear
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that output and employment stabilization and 
external considerations are also important." 3 
The Bundesbank Act leaves much more for discretionary policies than 
does the ECB Statute.
The tasks normally associated with the activities of a central bank 
will be the exclusive responsibility of the ECB, its major power being 
the formulation and implementation of monetary policy in the EC. It 
will also conduct the foreign exchange operations in accordance with 
the EMU exchange rate regime, and hold and manage the official 
foreign reserves of the participating states. With one exception the EC 
central banks agreed on the need to bring all foreign reserves assets 
of the participating countries into the ESCB - i.e. into the national 
central banks - not later than at the beginning of the third phase. 
Foreign reserve asstes held by official non-central bank bodies would 
have to be transferred to national central banks in order to ensure that 
exchange rate and monetary policy operations are not affected by 
transactions in official foreign reserve assets undertaken by official 
bodies outside the system. Other tasks set forth in the EC Central 
Bank Governors Committee Draft entrust the ESCB with functions in 
the context of a clearing and payments system and envisage for it 
share in the prudential supervision of the financial system for the 
purpose of safeguarding its structural and operational stability. As a 
matter of principle, the tasks incumbent on the ESCB will be carried 
out by the ECB. In conjunction with the prerogative to decide whether 
the ESCB shall be represented by the ECB or national central banks 
for the purpose of international monetary institutions, unless it
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approves that national central banks remain members of such entities, 
the ECB has a sweeping jurisdiction over the monetary domain in its 
entirety.
In sum, therefore, the EC Central Bank Governors Committee's 
draft responds to the need that the federal structure of the ESCB must 
not be an impediment limiting the efficiency of monetary policies and 
their implementation throughout the EC and in international monetary 
relations. Indeed it is common knowledge, born out by the monetary 
history both of states and international institutions, that monetary 
sovereignty is and has to remain indivisible. It must also have a 
uniform and central direction. There is no room for regional 
differentiations nor for the operation of the subsidiarity principle if the 
latter is unduly understood as an option for particular, divergent 
interests within the EC. While fortunately affirming these tenets, the 
draft is equally well advised in requiring that the ESCB 'speaks with 
one voice ' . Accordingly it insists that if the ECB, in representing the 
EC in international monetary institutions, is to conclude agreements 
on behalf of the EC, a provision to this effect would need to be 
introduced into the EC Treaty or the protocol setting forth the ECB 
statute.
Article 12 of the Bundesbank Act requires the Bundesbank to 
support the general economic policies of the German government, 
subject to the requirement of Article 3. Similarly, article 2 of the ECB 
Statute requires the ECB to support the general economic policies in 
the Community with a view to contributing^o the achievement of the 
objectives of the Community. In the absence of an EC government.
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however, the Communyty's objectives for economic policy exist in 
broad and vague formulations at best; Article 103 of the Maastricht 
Accord foresees that the Council of Ministers will draft a report 
describing the broad guideliness of the economic policies of the 
Member States and the Community to be adopted after discussion by 
the European Council. Thus, the ECB will not find it difficult to defend 
its own policies against requests to support vague policy goals. The 
Bundesbank, by contrast, has often been asked to support specific 
policies to raise output and employment or to support the 
government's fiscal stance.
4 .4  C en tra l-B an k Independence:
If the System is to achieve the primary objective of price stability 
the ECB decisionmaking bodies should be able to act on their own 
responsibility and not be subject to the instructions of political 
instances, as these might be in conflict with the pursuit of its 
objectives. Indeed, persons and institutions with political functions 
generally are not devoted exclusively to the maintenance of monetary 
value. As a rule they are not under an obligation of allegiance to price 
stability, nor do they feel that they owe such allegiance. It is a 
common experience that political authorities prefer the policy of giving 
easy access to monetary liquidity in order to attain economic policy 
targets.
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In refreshing clarity, the draft statute submitted by 
the EC Central Bank Governors Committee 
therefore states that the ECB, the national central 
banks, and the members of their decision-making 
bodies shall be independent from instructions by 
political authorities or any other bodies. The text 
goes on to require that Community institutions and 
bodies as well as the governments of Member 
States undertake to respect this principle and not 
to seek to influence members of the decision­
making bodies of the ECB and the national central 
banks in the performance of their task. 4 
Central-bank independence simply means that 
monetary policy can be carried out without 
government interference and even, if necessary, 
against the wishes of the government. By 
removing monetary policy from the domain of 
political interests, the central bank's ability to 
commit itself to long-run low-inflation policies is 
improved. This requires, in addition to institutional 
independence, personal independence for 
individual decisionmakers at the central bank. ^
One way to sever the link between government and the central 
bank is to cut off all channels of communication between the central 
bank and other government agencies; they cannot create mischief if 
they cannot talk to each other. Although seemingly extreme, this is
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essentially the solution adopted by the ECB Statute ruling that 
neither the ECB nor the national central banks shall seek or take 
instructions from Community institutions or member governments, and 
that member governments shall not try to influence the ECB. One 
interpretation of this ruling is that the ECB Statute was written to 
accommodate concerns of those countries that had no experience 
with central-bank independence and that independence rules out 
neither auditing nor the central bank's requirement to report regularly 
to the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, and the 
European Commission.
One important reason for creating an independent central bank is 
to prevent a government from using the money supply to finance 
public spending, transfer payments, and tax reductions to interest 
groups in exchange for votes. One way to achieve this is to keep the 
central bank from buying too much government debt or from 
overextending credit to government in other ways. The Bundesbank 
Act limits the extension of credit to the government to small overdrafts 
and prohibits altogether the purchase of public debt in primary 
markets. The Bundesbank's ability to finance the government 
indirectly is limited by the absence of a secondary market for short­
term government debt. Purchases of long-term government bonds 
play only a small role in German money supply.
The ECB Statute goes a step further and prohibits any direct 
monetary financing to the Community or to national or local 
governments. The Maastricht Accord rules that the Community shall 
not be liable for or assume the commitments of member governments
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or purchase debt instruments directly from them. The ECB may 
conduct open-market operations, however, for there are no 
restrictions on the purchase of government debt in secondary 
markets.
A crucial feature of an independent central bank is that it 
generates its own revenues and does not rely on a fiscal authority for 
its operations. The ECB will be constructed in this regard like a private 
bank. Each national central bank will provide capital and will transfer 
foreign assets to the ECB, and the property of the ECB will be exempt 
from all forms of requisition or expropriation. The ECB will earn 
income on specifically designated assets and will distribute it to the 
member banks according to their capital shares. It will, in sum, be 
financially independent.
"Personal independence relates both to the relations between 
central bankers and the administrations in office, and to partisanship 
on the part of the central bankers. The appointment process is the 
most important channel for political and partisan influence in this 
regard." 6 |f a government can freely appoint and dismiss board 
members, the members have good reason to conduct policies in the 
government's interest. Similarly, in countries where parties alternating 
in government have different views on monetary policy, the party in 
power is likely to appoint central bankers who share its ideology.
In order to prevent the undoing of institutional independence by 
frequent change of the persons appointed to the decision-making 
bodies of the ECB, its President, Vice-President and the other 
members of the Executive Board shall be appointed for a period of
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eight years, while the governors of the national central banks 
appertaining to the ECB Council as members shall have a term of 
office of no less than five years. Only the EC Court of Justice may 
compulsorily retire a member of the Executive Board from his office, 
on application by the ECB Council or by the Board itself, if that 
member no longer complies with the requirements of his high function 
or if he has been guilty of serious misconduct.
Central-bank independence requires freedom from any obligation 
to finance government deficits or monetize public debt. Because the 
central bank remains part of the public sector and governments can 
change central-bank laws to regain access to monetary financing, 
such freedom can ultimately be credible only if the government's 
financial position promises to remain stable. From this perspective, 
sound fiscal policies are a necessary condition for central-bank 
independence.
The Maastricht Accord recognizes this necessity and includes 
several provisions regarding fiscal policy in the member countries. 
Accordingly, the Community shall not be responsible for any financial 
obligations incurred by member governments or other public 
authorities. This same principle is reinforced which states also that a 
member state shall not be liable or assume any kind of public debt of 
another member state. Member states in a debt crisis will continue, 
however, to have the right to be bailed out by the Community or by 
other members.
Yet, the EC is a community of solidarity, and the equalization of 
standards of living across member states is one of its official goals.
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This means that the members will likely see it as a moral right, if not a 
legal obligation, to help a fellow member in financial trouble. 
Furthermore, policymakers will surely prefer crisis management, 
including a rise in the rate of monetary expansion in, EMU, if the 
alternative is to impose additional taxes and massive spending cuts 
on a troubled country. In short, EC membership implicitly provides 
insurance against debt crises, a provision that may compromise the 
quality of EMU.
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V  - T H E  B U N D E S B A N K : IS  IT  A  M O D E L  F O R  T H E  E C B ?
A future central bank for a common European currency will look 
much like the Bundesbank, following its model of independence from 
government and dedication to monetary policy.
There is a strong economic case for transforming 
the EMS into a monetary union, though the desire 
of some EC countries to replace the current 
overlordship of the Deutsche Bundesbank as 
being a major driving force behind moves towards 
an EC Central bank. 'I
If present trends continue, Europe's central bank will also be 
federal, distributing its policy-making powers throughout the 
Community, with representatives from all its members on the central 
council. The conceptual path towards monetary union in Europe 
increases the prospect that, however phase three of the Delors 
Committee's recommendation is implemented, it will succeed only if it 
meets the Bundesbank's demands for a Eurofed much like itself. 
Given its skill in reading European doctrine - especially when it comes 
to the fine points of monetary integration- the Bundesbank is poised to 
interpret the final Eurofed document until the contents suit its own 
norm of monetary stability.
Once monetary policies are linked, it becomes 
necessary to start talking about a European 
central bank if one does not want the German 
Bundesbank to become the de facto central bank
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for Europe. Since each country will want to have 
some influence on monetary policies, and since 
this influence is only to be had if there is a 
European central bank, it is only a question of 
time until a European central bank comes into 
existence. 2
The Bundesbank demanded that both the national central banks 
of the members of EMU and the European central bank should be 
independent from government influences, i.e. modelled more closely 
after the institutional structure of the Bundesbank. It is said that it 
would not let Germany to enter the union if this was not the case. In 
the current state of European central banks the Bundesbank objected 
to the inclusion of a system of European central banks into Stage 
Two, as it was planned by the Delors Committee.
Furthermore, it saw that the main purpose of the 
European central banks should be to safeguard 
the stability of the European currency. Overall, the 
Bundesbank wanted the European central bank 
and the European common currency to resemble 
itself and the DM as much as possible. 3 
On the other hand, most of German politicians considered European 
monetary integration as a political objective. "An extreme 
interpretation of this is that Germany saw European integration as a 
means to deliberately contain its increasing power into a framework 
acceptable for other European countries." 4
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In the general European discussion, Italy and France saw the 
establishment of European central bank at Stage Two as an impetus 
for adaptations in economic policies and performance, whereas the 
Bundesbank put them in opposite order.
The future European central bank will be modelled after the 
Bundesbank, and the strict criteria ensure that economic convergence 
will have to be realized before starting Stage Three. However, it is 
notable that the transformation in the end is automatic. This procedure 
was introduced by France to make sure that the European central 
bank will be established latest in July 1998 and at least a core of 
countries will move to Stage Three in 1999.
The first commentaries of the Maastricht Treaty were mostly 
concerned about the fact that Germany did not meet the economic 
performance criteria because of unification costs. “The countries 
qualifying were Denmark, France and Luxemburg. EMU without 
Germany would be virtually inconceivable, and it was anticipated that 
Germany's uncharacteristic weakness would indeed complicate the 
transition." ^ However, trust in Germany's economic strength was 
unrelinquished and its recovery in order to be a center of at least a 
core of states by 1997 was considered highly probable.
In terms of price stability, the Bundesbank has undoubtedly been 
the most successful European central bank in the past four decades, 
a success credit to its institutional framework. It is now commonly 
agreed that price stability should be the most important goal of the 
ECB. Has, then, the Bundesbank served as a model for the ECB and
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is the ECB of the Maastricht Accord simply a tighter edition of the 
Bundesbank?
The ECB and the Bundesbank share a formal status of 
independence, similarities in administrative structure, and explicit 
commitments under conditionality clauses. But the institutions follow 
two distinct models. The Bundesbank model is restrictive in the choice 
of instruments, and has a well-defined conditionality clause. The ECB 
has an unrestricted choice of instruments, a concrete objective, and a 
vague conditionality clause. The weight of 'central' interests is small 
and the definition of institutional independence is simple and 
operational in Bundesbank decisions as compared to the ECB. In 
addition, the Bundesbank's independence is weakened by its lack of 
control over the exchange-rate regime and by shortcomings with 
regard to personal independence. The ECB's position is the opposite.
The ECB will thus have less discretionary power than the 
Bundesbank to pursue an optimal monetary policy. It can be expected 
to focus more on price stability and less on output and employment 
stabilization. For lack of explicit provisions, the ECB will find it harder, 
in comparison to the Bundesbank, to defend itself against pressures 
to apply specific instruments and harder, therefore, to use only those 
most suitable for its policy. The ECB will be more strongly exposed to 
political pressures than the Bundesbank is once a common European 
economic policy follows further political integration. In addition, the 
Accord relies much more on personal independence than does the 
Bundesbank, and the control it places on exchange-rate policies
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reflects the influence of political pressures on European monetary 
policy.
A Central Bank Council majority believes that a European Central 
Bank can come into existence only after substantial European 
financial and economic integration. The position of this majority 
conforms to established Bundesbank theory : real factors and forces 
drive the economy, and these are beyond the reach of monetary 
policy.
It is clear that the ECB constitution promises much better 
outcomes than most existing central-bank constitutions in Europe. 
The fact that we know little about the empirical link between the 
constitutions and performances of central banks suggests, however, 
that the Bundesbank model should have a predictive power for the 
future performance of the European Central Bank.
The Bundesbank will continue to judge every plan for European 
monetary integration against its stability and its first concern will 
continue to be defending domestic price stability. These facts, 
combined with Germany's size, wealth and the asymmetric results of 
monetary Realpolitik, seem to secure the Bundesbank's present 
position as monetary hegemon of the European Community for the 
foreseeable future.
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